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Amnesia and the Defendant's Competency
to Stand Trial: Morrow v. State, 293 Md.
247, 443 A. 2d 108 (1982)
by Barbara R. Gathright
Introduction and
Background
Recently, in Morrow v. State, 293
Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108 (1982), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a defendant's amnesia does not
compel a finding of incompetence.
In the same opinion the court re-
flected a case-by-case approach to
the issue of competency and disa-
vowed a policy which requires a
post-trial determination of the de-
fendant's status. The court stated
that amnesia need not affect the
normal interplay between attorney
and client, nor does it necessarily
cause unfairness to the defendant.
Id.
Joseph Morrow was driving on
Belair Road when his car collided
head-on into another vehicle. He
sustained head injuries from the
crash, and a passenger in his car
died from injuries also sustained in
the accident. Morrow was indicted
on several charges, the most serious
of which was manslaughter by
automobile. Before trial Morrow re-
quested and received a competency
hearing based on his assertion that
he suffered post-traumatic amnesia.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore
County adjudged Morrow compe-
tent to stand trial and found him
guilty of manslaughter. The court of
appeals granted certiorari to ad-
dress the question of whether a de-
fendant who cannot remember the
facts of the incident for which he is
charged is incompetent to stand trial.
Id.
Amnesia is a memory disturbance
characterized by total or partial in-
ability to recall events from the past.
T. Stedman, Stedman's Medical Dic-
tionary 53 (24th ed. 1982). Post-trau-
matic amnesia, like that suffered by
Morrow, can follow a head injury.
Id. It is generally accepted that
everyone is amnesic to a certain de-
gree. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. at
254, 443 A.2d at 112 (1982). Tradi-
tionally, the amnesiac condition has
been viewed with great suspicion
since the condition is easily feigned.
W. Curran, A. McGarry and C.
Petty, Modern Legal Medicine, Psy-
chiatry and Forensic Science 795 (1980).
The origins of the amnesiac de-
fendant's status at trial are rooted
in common law considerations of
competency. These considerations
were codified by Congress in 1949
in 18 U.S.C. §4244. This statute, still
in effect, established the test of
competency to be whether the ac-
cused is "unable to understand the
proceedings against him or prop-
erly to assist in his own defense."
18 U.S.C. §4244 (1976). Today al-
most all jurisdictions have a similar
statute in force.
In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402 (1960), the United States Su-
preme Court interpreted the com-
petency standard to mean "whether
[the accused] has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has
a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against
him." This test is widely accepted
as the modern constitutional stand-
ard to determine a defendant's com-
petency to stand trial. R. Roesch and
S. Golding, Competency to Stand Trial
11 (1980).
When the accused is an amnesiac,
however, a minority of jurisdictions
have adopted a different approach.
In Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d
460 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court fo-
cused on the issue of "fairness" to
the amnesiac defendant when it ap-
plied a six-factor test for compe-
tency that expanded the prevailing
Dusky test. In Wilson, the defendant
sustained a severe head injury prior
to his arrest and had no memory of
the incident for which he was in-
dicted. The appellate panel re-
viewed the trial court's findings of
competency and remanded the case
for factual findings based on the fol-
lowing six-factor test: (1) the extent
to which the amnesia effects the de-
fendant's ability to consult with his
lawyer; (2) the extent to which the
amnesia affects his ability to testify
on his own behalf; (3) whether the
evidence can be extrinsically recon-
structed; (4) whether the govern-
ment has aided in this reconstruc-
tion; (5) the strength of the
defendant's case; and (6) any other
relevant facts or circumstances. Id.
at 463-464. The court in Wilson also
held that there must be a determi-
nation of the amnesiac's compe-
tence before and after trial. Id. at
463.
The Maryland Law
In 1888 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted the M'Naghten
rule for determining both the sanity
and the competency of the defend-
ant. Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13
A. 809 (1888). The M'Naghten rule
is derived from M'Naghten's Case
[1843] 10 CL and Fin 200, 8 E.R. 718,
which held that the defendant bears
the burden of proving that he is un-
able to distinguish right from wrong
and that he could not understand
the nature and consequences of his
act. This rule prevailed at common
law until the Maryland General As-
sembly adopted the federal stand-
ard for determining competency.
1967 Md. Laws 709, (current version
at Md. Health-General Code Ann.
§12-101(c)(1982)). Although the lan-
guage of the 1982 recodification var-
ies slightly from its predecessor, the
substance of the test remains the
same: "whether such person is un-
able to understand the nature of the
FORUM
object of the proceedings against him
and to assist in his own defense."
Cf. Md. Ann. Code art. 59, §23 (1979)
and Md. Health-General Code Ann.
§12-101(c) (1982).
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland applied the competency
test in Strawderman v. State, 4 Md.
App. 689, 244 A.2d 888 (1968), cert.
denied, 252 Md. 733 (1969). In Straw-
derman the court invalidated the
M'Naghten rule and substituted the
statutory language. The court de-
termined that the tests for criminal
responsibility and for competency
were clearly different, thus bifur-
cating the insanity defense. The
Strawderman decision clarified these
two areas and established different
standards of proof for each. Id.
In Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291,
372 A.2d 1069 (1977), predating
Morrow, the court of appeals fo-
cused on the trial judge's rulings in
a competency hearing and reaf-
firmed the validity of the Dusky
competency standard in this juris-
diction. (In Maryland, the compe-
tency of the defendant is deter-
mined in a formal hearing even
though the language of the relevant
statute requires only that "evidence
presented on the record" be used
by the court for its determination.
Md. Health-General Code Ann. §12-
102(a) (1982)). At a pre-trial hearing,
the trial court in Raithel found the
defendant competent to stand trial.
Thereafter, a jury convicted him of
first degree murder and other of-
fenses. The court of appeals held
that the trial court erred by failing
to determine at the pre-trial com-
petency hearing whether the de-
fendant could assist in his own de-
fense. This error was reversible error
since both prongs of the Dusky test
were not met. Id.
On only one occasion has a Mary-
land appellate court cited the Wilson
six-factor test discussed earlier. See
James v. State, 31 Md. App. 666, 358
A.2d 595, cert. denied, 278 Md. 725
(1976). In James, the defendant
sought to utilize the six-factor test,
but the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland distinguished Wilson and
stated that the Wilson test applies
only when the defendant's amnesia
is genuine; in James the defendant's
loss of memory was either feigned
or caused by an alcoholic black-out.
Id.
Prior to the Morrow decision,
Maryland courts followed the fed-
eral standards of Dusky and re-
quired a pre-trial hearing on the is-
sue of competency; the divergent
procedure and approach advocated
in Wilson were not recognized.
However, until Morrow, the com-
petency of a defendant suffering
from a genuine case of amnesia re-
mained an issue of first impression
in Maryland.
The Morrow Rationale
In determining whether an am-
nesiac defendant is competent to
stand trial, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Morrow relied on the
policies that "amnesia is present to
some degree in everyone" and that
the amnesiac defendant is realisti-
cally in no worse position than many
other defendants who do not have
important facts before them. Re-
butting the procedure advocated by
the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Wilson, the Mary-
land court stressed the clear lan-
guage of the applicable statute.
Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 443
A.2d 108 (1982).
The language of the statute, cited
by the court as "a model of clarity,"
Id. at 255, 443 A.2d at 113, requires
that the trial court determine the is-
sue of competency prior to or dur-
ing the trial if it appears to the court
or if it is alleged by the defendant
that the defendant is incompetent.
See Md. Ann. Code art. 59, §23 (1979)
(current version at Md. Health-Gen-
eral Code Ann. §12-102(a)(1982)).
Furthermore, the court may, in its
discretion, reconsider the compe-
tency issue at any time during the
XII/2
trial and before the verdict is ren-
dered. Id. The Maryland statute does
not require a post-trial hearing on
the competency question, nor does
it advance the six-factor test of Wil-
son.
The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land found highly persuasive an In-
diana case with a fact pattern sim-
ilar to the facts of Morrow. See Reagon
v. State, 253 Ind. 143, 251 N.E.2d
829 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042
(1970). In Reagon the defendant sus-
tained an injury to his head which
resulted in a genuine loss of mem-
ory. Supporting the determination
that the defendant received a fair
trial, the court of appeals in Morrow
cited the Reagon rationale:
[m]any times in a trial of a crim-
inal case evidence is lost, a ma-
terial witness dies, or as in this
case, the defendant has amne-
sia as to certain events or a time.
Still, such handicaps from a de-
fendant's point of view cannot
prevent a trial from taking place
eventually. Rarely would we
find a case in which a defend-
ant could not contend that he
was deprived of some evidence
and therefore he ought not to
be tried.
Morrow v. State, 293 Md. at 254, 443
A.2d at 112 (1982).
Thus, while the Wilson six-factor
test may be gaining acceptance in
other jurisdictions, in Maryland the
two-pronged competency test of
Dusky continues to be the standard.
Declining to take a case-by-case ap-
proach to the determination of an
amnesiac's competency, the appel-
late court chose to follow the precise
wording of the statute and to rely
on the trial court's ability to prop-
erly apply the law so as to preserve
the fairness of the trial.
Analysis of the Morrow
Decision
Holding that Morrow received a
fair trial, the court of appeals fol-
lowed the mainstream of opinion on
the competency issue. One argu-
ment in favor of this holding is the
presumption that amnesia may eas-
ily be feigned; therefore, the de-
fendant's allegations of incompet-
ence may not be worthy of elevation
"to the dignity of legal incompet-
ence." Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795,
801 (Alaska 1974). Another argu-
ment supporting the fair trial theory
focuses on the problem of what to
do with the amnesiac defendant.
Public policy dictates that he should
not be allowed to go free if there is
a strong case against him. State v.
Pugh, 117 N.J. Super. 26, 283 A.2d
537 (1971). Yet, it seems fundamen-
tally unfair to allow commitment
proceedings when the defendant has
not been tried and found guilty. M.
Guttmacher and H. Weihofen, Psy-
chiatry and the Law 164-170 (1952).
The majority opinion in Morrow
emphasized the ability of the de-
fendant's counsel to adequately
prepare a defense. The amnesiac
defendant may maintain that he is
unduly prejudiced by his memory
loss because he cannot reconstruct
the events that led to the charges
against him. Morrow v. State, 293 Md.
at 255, 443 A.2d at 113 (1982). How-
ever, in most cases the State's files
are open to the defense, and this is
considered by the courts to be
enough to cancel any prejudice that
might otherwise occur. The court in
Morrow alluded to this open file pol-
icy and was thus apparently satis-
fied that the record reflected "full
access, prior to trial, to information
used by the State." Id. at 256, 443
A.2d'at 114.
Application of the Wilson six-fac-
tor test probably would not have
aided the defendant in Morrow be-
cause the test is essentially a bal-
ancing of two considerations. Wil-
son balances the inherent prejudice
to the defendant with the strength
of the case against the defendant,
while taking into consideration
whether the prosecution has coop-
erated in opening their files. In view
of the strong circumstantial case
against Morrow, the Wilson test
probably would not have changed
the outcome of the case.
The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land found the Wilson requirement
of a post-trial determination of com-
petency to be unduly burdensome
for the trial court. The Maryland
statute permits the trial judge to
conduct a hearing at any time until
the verdict is rendered. This safe-
guard apparently satisfies the con-
science of Maryland's highest court.
A post-trial determination of the
competency issue would be unnec-
essary for the trial court. The court
of appeals has thus chosen to rely
on the trial court's ability to protect
the defendant's constitutional rights
pursuant to the statutory proce-
dure.
Conclusion
In Morrow v. State, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has followed
the trend of its prior case law and
joined the mainstream of opinion
on the competency issue as it relates
to the amnesiac defendant. A public
policy argument based on practi-
cality and expediency is one of sev-
eral rationales. Public policy sup-
ports the notion that the amnesiac's
situation is similar to that of other
defendants who are tried without
all of the evidence at their disposal.
Additionally, the defendant's abil-
ity to reconstruct the evidence
through information received from
the State alleviates any unfairness.
While other jurisdictions evi-
denced a greater concern for the
amnesiac's competency to stand trial
than the Maryland courts, the Mor-
row decision stands for the propo-
sition that the Maryland statute af-
fords sufficient protection of the
defendant's rights. Therefore, in
Maryland, the defendant's compe-
tency can be questioned at any time
prior to or during the trial. How-
ever, once the verdict is rendered,
an amnesiac defendant must use the
appellate process for further deter-
mination of that issue. Thus, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has
accepted the rationale that the de-
fendant may be entitled to a fair trial,
but not a perfect one.
